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Abstract
This paper investigates fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as
a way to overcome free riding in the private provision of public goods,
under the assumptions of income heterogeneity and incomplete infor-
mation about income levels. We compare experimentally the perfor-
mance of a lottery, an all-pay auction and a benchmark voluntary con-
tribution mechanism. We ﬁnd that prize-based mechanisms perform
better than voluntary contribution in terms of public good provision
after accounting for the cost of the prize. Comparing the prize-based
mechanisms, total contributions are signiﬁcantly higher in the lottery
than in the all-pay auction. Focusing on individual income types, the
lottery outperforms voluntary contributions and the all-pay auction
throughout the income distribution.
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Finding eﬀective fund-raising mechanisms for the private provision of public
goods is an important policy question. Voluntary contributions to public
goods are typically well below socially optimal levels, given the incentive to
free ride associated with positive externalities.1 While fund-raising mecha-
nisms based on tax rewards and penalties can be designed to overcome the
incentive to free ride, they are not available to fund-raisers in the private
sector who cannot enforce sanctions. A number of recent studies have exam-
ined, both theoretically and empirically, the performance of incentive-based
funding mechanisms for the private provision of public goods, focusing in par-
ticular on lotteries (or raﬄes) and diﬀerent types of auctions (e.g. Morgan,
2000; Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Goeree et al., 2005; Orzen, 2005; Schram
and Onderstal, 2006).2
In this paper we investigate with a laboratory experiment the performance
of prize-based mechanisms for the private provision of public goods, under
the assumptions of income heterogeneity and incomplete information about
income levels. We focus on a voluntary contribution mechanism, used as
a benchmark, and two incentive-based mechanisms where a single prize is
awarded: a lottery and an all-pay auction.
The experimental literature on incentive-based fund-raising mechanisms
has focused on the case of income homogeneity (e.g. Morgan and Sefton,
2000; Orzen, 2005; Schram and Onderstal, 2006). However, actual contri-
bution to public goods is generally characterised by heterogeneous incomes
which are private information. Although several experimental studies have
investigated public good provision when incomes are heterogeneous, this
literature has only explored the voluntary contribution mechanism.3 The
performance of incentive-based fund-raising mechanisms when subjects have
diﬀerent incomes remains empirically unexplored.
Morgan (2000) provides a theoretical analysis of lotteries as a way to
ﬁnance public goods. Players buy tickets of a lottery in which one prize
is awarded. One ticket is randomly drawn and the holder wins the prize.
1Voluntary contributions to public goods are generally found to be greater than theo-
retical predictions, both in naturally occurring situations and in laboratory experiments,
but nevertheless sub-optimal. See Ledyard (1995) for a survey of the experimental lit-
erature on the provision of public goods. See also e.g. Keser (1996), Laurie and Holt
(1998), and Saijo (2003) for alternative explanations of over-contribution in the voluntary
provision of public goods.
2See also e.g. Isaac and Walker (1988), Bagnoli, and Lipman (1989), Bagnoli and
McKee (1991) for earlier studies on mechanisms for improving economic eﬃciency in the
voluntary provision of public goods.
3Research has examined the eﬀects of income heterogeneity on either overall public
good provision (Anderson et al., 2004; Chan et al., 1996; Chan et al., 1999; Rapoport and
Suleiman, 1993) or contributions of individual income types (Buckley and Croson, 2005).
2Public good provision consists of the revenue of the lottery net of the prize.
The author considers agents with heterogeneous preferences and endowments
who have quasi-linear utility functions. Public good provision is shown to
be strictly higher than with voluntary contributions. The solution identiﬁed
by Morgan (2000) predicts that agents with diﬀerent incomes contribute the
same amount in equilibrium. Such an equilibrium does not seem realistic,
while it appears more plausible that the contribution would be increasing in
the endowment. Morgan and Sefton (2000) investigate experimentally the
performance of a linear version of Morgan’s model, ﬁnding that, as predicted,
public good provision via a lottery is higher than through voluntary contri-
butions. However they only consider homogeneous endowments, without
testing the validity of a completely symmetric equilibrium.
Orzen (2005) compares in a laboratory experiment the performance of
a lottery and diﬀerent all-pay auctions as fund-raising mechanisms, under
the assumptions of homogeneous preferences and endowments. Public good
provision generated by the incentive-based mechanisms is higher than volun-
tary contributions. Interestingly, although theory predicts that the ﬁrst price
all-pay auction raises a higher revenue than the lottery, no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence is found between the two treatments. Finally, Schram and Onderstal
(2006) present an experimental study that compares a winner-pay auction,
an all-pay auction and a lottery in the case of heterogeneous preferences,
but homogeneous endowments. They ﬁnd that the all-pay auction performs
better than the lottery mechanism, as predicted by the theory. In sum, all
of these studies focus on the case of homogeneous endowments.
Our analysis is based on a theoretical framework where prizes are used as
am e a n st oﬁnance public goods when agents have heterogeneous endowments
which are private information. In this setting, an all-pay auction generates a
higher expected total contribution than a lottery with an equal prize. In the
all-pay auction, it is possible to identify a monotone equilibrium such that
contributions are strictly increasing in the endowment. The equilibrium of
the lottery is instead completely symmetric, as in Morgan (2000), with all
agents contributing the same amount independently of their endowment.
In our experiment, we test the following theoretical predictions. First,
incentive-based mechanisms should outperform the voluntary contribution
mechanism in terms of net contributions (after taking into account the cost
of prizes). Second, the total revenue of the all-pay auction should be higher
than that of a lottery with an equal prize. Third, absolute contributions
should not depend on income in the lottery, whereas they should rise with
income in the all-pay auction. As a consequence, individual contributions
should be higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction at the lower end
of the income distribution, while the opposite should hold at the upper end
of the income distribution.
3The main ﬁndings of the analysis can be summarised as follows. In all
mechanisms average contributions are generally higher than theoretical pre-
dictions and tend to converge towards the predicted values over successive
rounds. The voluntary contribution mechanism replicates the behavioural
patterns observed in similar experiments under income homogeneity or het-
erogenous incomes and complete information. The introduction of a prize
as an incentive has signiﬁcant eﬀects on contributions: the lottery and, to a
lesser extent, the all-pay auction perform better than voluntary contribution
in terms of public good provision after accounting for the cost of prizes. Com-
paring the prize-based mechanisms, contributions are signiﬁcantly higher in
the lottery than in the all-pay auction, contrary to the theoretical predictions.
Focusing on the behaviour of individual income types, absolute contributions
rise with income in all treatments, although more steeply in the prize-based
mechanisms, so that relative contributions are generally similar across in-
come types. In terms of relative performance, the lottery does better than
the other mechanisms for all income types. At the individual level, subjects
choose zero contributions in the all-pay auction about three times as often
as in the lottery.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
background of the analysis. Section 3 describes the experimental design
and the theoretical predictions to be tested. Section 4 presents the results.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the main ﬁndings and implications
of the analysis.
2 Theoretical Background
In this section we present the main theoretical predictions for the performance
of single-prize all-pay auctions and lotteries, as fund-raising mechanisms for
the private provision of public goods, under the assumptions of income het-
erogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. The analysis is
based on the framework presented in Faravelli (2007).
Consider a public good game with n risk neutral players. Each player
i is assumed to have income zi, which is private information. Incomes are
drawn independently of each other from the distribution function F(z)o nt h e
interval [z
¯
, ¯ z]. F(z) is common knowledge and has a continuous and bounded
density F0(z). Each player has to decide how much of his endowment to
contribute to the public good, knowing that total contributions to the public
good are multiplied by a parameter α ∈ (1,n) and shared equally among
all the agents. The cost of contributing to the public good exceeds the
marginal return of investing in it. Therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium
is to contribute nothing, although it is socially optimal to contribute all the
endowment.
4Suppose that the fund-raiser has access to an amount Π. The fund-raiser
moves ﬁrst. He can either use Π to provide the public good or organise
either a lottery or an all-pay auction in which the winner is awarded a prize
equal to Π. Then the agents choose their contributions in order to maximise
their utility (expected utility in the case of an all-pay auction), given the
other players’ contributions and the value of Π. If the fund-raiser spends all
his budget Π to provide the public good then the payoﬀ of of player i with
endowment zi who contributes gi is given by
zi − gi +
α
n
(Π + gi + G−i)
where G−i is the sum of the contributions of all the other players. If the
fund-raisers uses Π as a prize, player i’s payoﬀ will be




where g−i represents the vector of the individual contributions of all the other
players. E[Π,g i,g −i] is the expected prize of player i given all the other
players’ contributions. In the lottery, player i wins the prize with probability
gi
gi+G−i, which is the number of tickets he bought divided by the total number
of tickets. In the all-pay auction he wins if and only if his contribution is
higher than all the other agents’ contributions.
The main results for the diﬀerent contribution mechanisms can be sum-
marised as follows.4 In the voluntary contribution mechanism the Nash equi-
librium is to contribute nothing. At interior solutions,5 the lottery has a
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (as in Morgan, 2000) where every player












Total contribution is higher than the cost of the prize. If public good pro-
vision is socially desirable the lottery provides positive net revenues. The
all-pay auction, at an interior solution for all players, has a symmetric pure







4See Faravelli (2007) for the proofs of the following results.
5We focus on the case in which constraints are non-binding for all agents.
5Note that contributions in equilibrium are strictly increasing in the endow-
ment. F(z)n−1Π represents the expected prize of a player with endowment
z, when all players play according to the same strictly increasing strategy.






The above expression is strictly greater than both the cost of the prize and
the total contribution under the lottery. A lottery can be thought of as a
stochastic all-pay auction, where the higher noise results in lower revenue
(see Tullock, 1980).
Note that the equilibrium strategy function described by expression (2)
can be rearranged as gAPA(z)= 1
1−α
n
F(z)n−1Π.T h i si st h es u mo fac o n v e r -
gent series with reason α











The standard result in all-pay auctions is the total dissipation of the rent.
In this case each individual bids more than the expected prize because of the
marginal return of investing in the public good, which is equal to α
n.
3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design follows Morgan and Sefton (2005) and, more closely,
Orzen (2005), while introducing income heterogeneity and incomplete infor-
mation about the income of other subjects. We considered three diﬀerent
treatments: a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), a lottery (LOT)
and an all-pay auction (APA). We ran three sessions for each treatment,
with sixteen subjects participating in each session, for a total of 144 sub-
jects. Each session consisted of 20 rounds.
3.1 The Baseline Game
T h eb a s e l i n eg a m ei sas t a n d a r dl i n e a r public good game, with the intro-
duction of income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income
levels. At the beginning of each session the sixteen subjects were randomly
and anonymously assigned an endowment of either 120, 160, 200, or 240 to-
kens.6 The subjects were informed that in each round they would receive the
same endowment as determined at the beginning of the session.
6Concentrating on a small number of possible endowments allowed us to analyse the
eﬀects of income heterogeneity in a controlled and simple setting, while providing several
observations on the same income type.
6Incomplete information about incomes was introduced by using a match-
ing procedure similar to the strangers c o n d i t i o nu s e di nA n d r e o n i( 1 9 8 8 ) .
At the beginning of each round, subjects were randomly and anonymously
rematched in groups of four players. Therefore, in each round subjects did
not know the identity and the endowment of the other three members of
their group. They only knew that the endowment of each of the other group
members could be either 120, 160, 200, or 240 tokens with equal probabilities.
Group matching for each of the twenty rounds was determined randomly
before the beginning of the experiment in the following way. Four pools of
four subjects were formed, each containing the four diﬀerent income types
(120, 160, 200, 240). Each of the four groups was formed by randomly
drawing one subject from each pool. As a consequence, within every group
each member could have an endowment of 120, 160, 200, or 240 tokens with
equal probability.7 Having formed the four groups for each round in this
way, the same sequence of group matchings for the twenty rounds was used
in each session of all three treatments.
In each round, every subject had to allocate entirely a given endowment
between two accounts. The language used in the instructions did not refer to
contributions or public goods, but asked subjects to allocate tokens to either
an “individual account” or a “group account”. We set α =2a n d ,w i t hn =4 ,
the return from the group account was α
n =0 .5. In order to avoid decimals,
returns from both accounts were multiplied by two. Therefore, a subject
received 2 points for each token he allocated to the individual account, while
he received 1 point for each token allocated by him or by any other member
of his group to the group account.
3.2 Treatments
The three treatments diﬀered in the way prizes (extra points) could be earned
by the subjects. In VCM, 120 tokens were exogenously allocated by the ex-
perimenter to the group account in each round, independently of the subjects’
choices, thus implying that each member of the group received 120 points
as a bonus. In LOT, a subject received a lottery ticket for each token he
allocated to the group account. At the end of each round the computer ran-
domly selected one ticket among all those purchased by the members of the
group, and the owner of the selected ticket won the prize of 240 points. In
case no tokens were allocated to the group account, the winner of the prize
was selected randomly among the four members of the group. In APA, in
each round the member of the group who allocated the highest amount to
the group account won the prize of 240 points. In case of ties between two or
7Note that in every round there were four subjects for each of the four possible endow-
ments, so that the average endowment was 180 tokens.
7more group members, the winner was determined randomly by the computer.
Note that the four mechanisms imply the same ﬁnancial commitment for the
fund-raiser: allocating 120 tokens to the group account in VCM is equivalent
to paying a prize of 240 points in APA or in LOT.
3.3 Procedures
In each session, the subjects were randomly assigned to a computer terminal
at their arrival. To ensure public knowledge, instructions were distributed
and read aloud (see Appendix A for the instructions). Moreover, to ensure
understanding of the experimental design, sample questions were distributed
and the answers privately checked and, if necessary, individually explained
to the subjects.
At the end of each round, the subjects were informed about their payoﬀs
from the group account, the individual account and the prize (or bonus in
VCM). At the end of the last round, subjects were informed about their total
payoﬀ for the twenty rounds expressed in points and euros. They were then
asked to answer a short questionnaire on the understanding of the experiment
and socio-demographic information, a n dw e r et h e np a i di np r i v a t eu s i n ga n
exchange rate of 1000 points per euro. Subjects earned 12.25 euros on average
for sessions lasting about 50 minutes, including the time for instructions.
Participants were mainly undergraduate students of Economics and were
recruited through an online system. The experiment took place in May 2006
at the Experimental Lab of the University of Milan Bicocca. The experiment
was computerized using the zTree software (Fischbacher, 1999).
3.4 Predictions
In this experimental design, within each group every subject can have one
of four possible endowments with equal probability. Compared with the
model described in Section 2, where each player’s endowment is drawn from
a continuous distribution function, it is easy to see that the equilibrium in
VCM will still be to contribute nothing. Similarly, LOT is characterised
by the same equilibrium as described by equation (1), and the same total
contribution. This is because the best response function of a player in the
lottery game is independent of income, as in Morgan (2000). The equilibrium
is instead slightly modiﬁed in APA, although qualitatively unchanged, given
that the pure strategy equilibrium, as described by equation (2), depends on
the continuity of endowment distribution.
In Appendix B we consider an all-pay auction in a linear public good
game where each player’s endowment is drawn from a discrete distribution
function, under the assumption of complete information. We solve the game
8for N players, who can have any possible endowment, and for any positive
level of prize. We show that when the prize is not too “high”, only mixed
strategy equilibria exist. The equilibrium for a subject under incomplete
information about the incomes of other players consists of a randomisation
over the mixed strategies he would play in all the possible group matchings
he faces, according to their corresponding probabilities.8
The total expected contribution in APA for the mixed strategy equilib-
rium under a discrete income distribution is lower than that for the pure
strategy equilibrium under a continuous income distribution. This loss of
revenue results from the discontinuity in the possible endowments: a subject
with an endowment higher than the lowest one will face opponents with a
strictly lower endowment with positive probability. In this case he will not
have any incentive to bid more than the highest of his opponents’ endow-
ments. Nevertheless, despite the lower expected revenue, all the theoretical
predictions described in Section 2 under a continuous distribution of endow-
ments are qualitatively unchanged.
Table 1 presents the predicted contributions for the experimental design,
both in absolute and relative terms, for each income type and on average.
Average contributions for both prize-based mechanisms are higher than the
predicted contribution in VCM, which is zero. They are also higher than
the average provision in VCM, where an amount equivalent to the cost of
the prize is used to directly ﬁnance the public good, resulting in an average
provision of 30 tokens per subject. The average absolute contribution in
APA (51 tokens) is higher than in LOT (45 tokens). Note also that in LOT
the predicted absolute contributions are independent of income levels (25%
in relative terms on average). Predicted contributions are instead steeply
increasing in the endowment in APA, both in absolute and relative terms.
Summing up, the main hypotheses to be tested are as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (Absolute Eﬃciency): Both LOT and APA
outperform VCM not only in terms of gross contributions, but
also after taking into account the cost of the prize.
Hypothesis 2 (Relative Eﬃciency): The total contribution
to the public good is higher in APA than in LOT.
Hypothesis 3 (Individual income types): Individual contri-
butions do not depend on income in LOT, while they increase
with income in APA. Contributions are therefore higher in LOT
8For instance, a subject endowed with 120 tokens could be grouped with three other
subjects with his same endowment, or with one subject with 160 and two others with 200
tokens, and so on.
9Table 1: Theoretical predictions: absolute and relative contributions
Incomes Average
Treatments 120 160 200 240 180
Absolute contributions
V C M 00000
L O T 4 54 54 54 54 5
APA 5 28 68 102 51
Relative contributions
V C M 00000
L O T 3 82 82 31 92 5
APA 4 18 34 43 28
Note: contributions are rounded to the nearest integer. Relative contributions are ex-
pressed as a percentage of the endowment.
than in APA for low-income types, while the opposite holds for
high-income types.
4R e s u l t s
This section presents the experimental results. We start with a descriptive
analysis of the main features of the data for the three treatments. Next,
we examine the replicability of sessions within each treatment, the eﬀects of
repetition over rounds, and the dependence of individual observations within
sessions. We then present formal tests of the theoretical predictions, consid-
ering ﬁrst average contributions over all subjects and then contributions by
individual income types.
4.1 Overview
Figures 1-3 present an overview of average relative contributions (as a per-
centage of the endowment) over rounds for each session of the three treat-
ments. Table 2 reports relative contributions obtained by averaging over all
subjects within each session for all 20 rounds and for the following sub-sets
of rounds: 1st, ﬁrst 10, last 10, and 20th.
The results for VCM sessions are similar to those generally obtained in
public good experiments with homogeneous incomes. Average contributions
to the group account are substantially higher than the equilibrium prediction
of zero throughout the twenty rounds, but display a clear downward trend
over successive rounds (Figure 1). Averaging over all sessions and subjects,
individual contributions are 21.6% over the 20 rounds, falling from 35.1%
10Table 2: Average individual contributions: by session and rounds
Rounds
Session 1-20 1 1-10 11-20 20
VCM 1 18.6 25.7 20.6 16.6 7.7
VCM 2 26.3 32.4 28.9 23.7 11.2
VCM 3 19.9 47.1 28.9 10.9 5.7
Average 21.6 35.1 26.1 17.1 8.2
LOT 1 42.1 38.5 45.3 38.9 39.9
LOT 2 46.2 48.5 50.0 42.3 39.3
LOT 3 52.7 45.7 52.8 52.5 41.8
Average 47.0 44.2 49.4 44.6 40.3
APA 1 41.8 51.8 46.0 37.7 52.4
APA 2 40.7 46.8 45.3 36.1 29.2
APA 3 36.2 45.3 38.5 33.9 30.3
Average 39.6 48.0 43.2 35.9 37.3
Note: contributions to the public good are expressed as a percentage of the endowment.
in the ﬁrst round to 8.2% in the last round, and from 26.1% in rounds 1-
10 to 17.1% in rounds 11-20. The same pattern of positive but declining
contributions is observed in each of the three VCM sessions, and a clear
tendency to converge to a common level is observed in the ﬁnal rounds.
Average contributions for LOT sessions are also systematically higher
than the predicted contribution of 25%, and remain virtually constant over
time, except for a slight decline in the ﬁnal rounds (Figure 2). Average
contributions over all sessions, subjects and rounds are 47%, falling from
44.2% to 40.3% over the 20 rounds, and from 49.4% to 44.6% between the
ﬁrst and the second half of the session. The declining pattern is not observed
in all sessions and, although the three sessions converge to a common level
in the ﬁnal round, a relatively high variability across sessions is observed in
rounds 11-20.
In APA sessions, average contributions are larger than the predicted con-
tribution of 28%, and display a slight decline over rounds (Figure 3). All
sessions start with relatively high contributions, but tend to converge to the
theoretical prediction within the ﬁrst ten rounds. The average contribution
is 39.6% over the twenty rounds, falling from 43.2% in rounds 1-10 to 35.9%
in rounds 11-20. Each of the three APA sessions displays the same pattern
of declining contributions, and the proﬁles are very similar.
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4.2 Replicability, Repetition, Sectional Dependence
The descriptive analysis of session-level data indicates that contributions for
individual sessions within each treatment are qualitatively similar in terms
of both average levels and dynamics over rounds. We provide formal tests
for the hypothesis of replicability of session results within treatments. Table
3 presents Kruskal-Wallis test statistics for the null hypothesis that median
contributions are equal across the three sessions within each treatment, fo-
cusing on the same sub-sets of rounds as in Table 2. Focusing on the whole
session (rounds 1-20) or the last round, the results indicate that the null hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected for all treatments. We therefore conclude that the
three sessions can be pooled and the analysis is carried out on observations
for 48 individuals for each of the three treatments.
The analysis of session-level data also indicates that there are substantial
changes in contributions over successive rounds (repetition eﬀects). Contri-
butions tend to fall over rounds, generally converging towards theoretical
predictions, in all treatments except for LOT, where the tendency to con-
verge is less marked. This could suggest that excessive contributions may
be due to the fact that subjects are learning how to behave rationally. We
provide formal tests for the eﬀects of repetition on contributions. Table 4
presents results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the hypothesis that me-
dian contributions are the same across selected pairs of rounds within each
treatment.
13Table 3: Tests for replicability of sessions
Rounds
Treatment 1-20 1 1 - 10 11-20 20
VCM 4.93 5.83 4.21 6.43 0.75
(0.08) (0.05) (0.12) (0.04) (0.69)
LOT 2.16 1.08 0.89 3.68 0.26
(0.34) (0.58) (0.64) (0.16) (0.88)
APA 1.90 0.50 1.67 0.99 2.83
(0.39) (0.78) (0.43) (0.61) (0.24)
Note: the table reports Kruskal-Wallis test statistics for the null hypothesis that median
contributions are equal across the three sessions within each treatment. P-values (in
brackets) are based on the χ2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.
Table 4: Tests for repetition eﬀects
Rounds
Treatment 1 vs 10 10 vs 20 1 vs 15 5 vs 20 1 vs 20
VCM 3.04 2.96 3.26 4.11 5.54
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LOT -1.42 1.65 -0.04 1.23 0.99
(0.16) (0.10) (0.97) (0.22) (0.32)
APA 2.04 0.16 1.95 -0.31 1.76
(0.04) (0.87) (0.05) (0.76) (0.08)
Note: the table reports normalized Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics for the hypothesis
that median contributions are the same in the two rounds indicated in the column
headings. P-values (in brackets) refer to two-sided tests based on the standard normal
distribution.
14Irrespective of the time horizon considered, decreases in contributions
are signiﬁcant in VCM. LOT does not display any signiﬁcant round eﬀect,
whereas in APA the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant between rounds 1 and 10 (p-
value 0.04) and marginally signiﬁcant between rounds 1 and 20 (p-value 0.08).
We conclude that repetition aﬀects diﬀerent mechanisms in diﬀerent ways,
so that comparisons between treatments, and between actual and predicted
contributions within treatments, cannot focus on a single round but should
consider alternative sub-sets of rounds in order to take into account the
diﬀerent role played by repetition in each treatment.
In order to go beyond descriptive analysis and provide formal tests of
the theoretical predictions we need to deﬁne the appropriate unit of analysis
(subject, group, session). It is important to note that, because of repetition,
subject-level observations within each session and round might be dependent,
given that (in rounds beyond the ﬁrst) subjects have interacted in previous
rounds. In addition, because of the random rematching mechanism (at the
beginning of each round subjects are randomly and anonymously rematched
in groups of four people), independence could also be violated for group-
level observations. If the dependence of subject-level observations due to
interactions in earlier rounds was relevant, inference would have to be based
on session-level observations (see e.g. Orzen, 2005).
However, the characteristics of the experimental design are such that
the dependence across individual observations can be considered negligible.
First, at the end of each round subjects only learn about the total con-
tribution of other group members, so that it is diﬃcult for them to infer
individual absolute contributions. Second, since subjects do not know the
endowments of other group members, it is even more diﬃcult for them to
infer other subjects’ relative contributions (e.g. an absolute contribution of
120 could be a relative contribution of 50% as well as 100%, depending on
the endowment of the other subject). Third, the number of players within
each session (sixteen) is suﬃciently large, so that subjects know that there
is a relatively small probability of interacting with the same subjects as in
the previous round. This further reduces the motivation to reciprocate in
successive rounds, thus weakening the possible dependence across individual
observations.
We also investigated the issue at the empirical level, by considering Spear-
man rank correlation tests for the null hypothesis of independence between
the contributions of each subject and the average contributions of the sub-
jects who were in his group in the previous round. The test statistics, based
on 16 individual observations for each session and each round, are signiﬁcant
a tt h e5p e rc e n tl e v e li no n l ya b o u t1 5p e r c e n to ft h ec a s e s . I na d d i t i o n ,
within the signiﬁcant cases, 30% of the correlation coeﬃcients are positive
and 70% are negative, indicating that there is no systematic pattern in the
15relationship between each subject’s contribution and those of his past group
members. As a result, considering both the features of the experimental de-
sign and the results of the Spearman tests, we conclude that the dependence
across individuals can be considered negligible. Hence, in the following, we
use subjects as the unit of analysis (see Morgan and Sefton, 2000, for a similar
approach).
4.3 Comparison between Treatments: Total Contribu-
tions
In order to compare the relative performance of the diﬀerent funding mech-
anisms, Figure 4 displays average individual contributions over rounds for
each treatment.9 The introduction of prizes has a substantial eﬀect on in-
dividual contributions. Average contributions in LOT are more than twice
as large as in VCM over the 20 rounds, and about ﬁve times as large in the
ﬁnal round. Average contributions in APA are almost twice as large as in
VCM over the 20 rounds and almost ﬁv et i m e sa sl a r g ei nt h eﬁnal round.
It is important to observe, however, that VCM is not directly comparable
with the incentive-based treatments in terms of individual contributions. In
order to make the results comparable we must either consider contributions
net of the cost of prizes in the incentive-based mechanisms or, equivalently,
refer to overall provision (i.e. also take into account public provision in
VCM). Public provision in VCM accounts for 120 tokens per group, cor-
responding to about 17 percentage points per subject in terms of relative
contributions. Figure 5 displays average public good provision over rounds,
providing the appropriate reference for comparing incentive-based mecha-
nisms with the benchmark VCM.
Interestingly, when we compare the treatments in terms of overall provi-
sion (or, equivalently, contributions net of the cost of prizes), the comparison
of the incentive-based mechanisms relative to VCM is not as clear-cut as be-
fore. While LOT systematically outperforms VCM (with the only exception
of the ﬁrst round), APA provision is very close to VCM, except for the last
rounds where the two proﬁles diverge. Averaging over all rounds, relative to
VCM, public good provision in LOT is about 20 per cent higher and 3.5 per
cent higher in APA.
9The graphs conﬁrm that repetition strongly aﬀects each treatment in diﬀerent ways.
Both incentive-based mechanisms display high contribution levels in initial rounds, but
their dynamics in the following rounds diﬀer. While in the ﬁrst ten rounds of APA con-
tributions decline markedly, in the lottery they remain virtually unchanged. Thereafter,
contributions fall somewhat in LOT, while they remain constant in APA. As a consequence,
focusing on ﬁnal rounds only, LOT and APA converge to very similar contribution levels.
VCM contributions are on a downward trend and are systematically lower than those of
the other two mechanisms.




























































17The informal evidence presented in Figure 5 is examined further in Table
5, presenting results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of the null hypothesis that
median public good provision is the same across treatments. The ﬁrst two
tests compare each of the incentive-based mechanisms with the benchmark
VCM. The next compares APA with LOT. Given that our model predicts
the direction of departure from the null hypothesis, we use the relevant one
sided-tests.
Table 5: Tests of equality between treatments: All subjects
Rounds
Treatments 1-20 1 1 - 10 11-20 20
LOT - VCM 4.55 -3.10 3.43 4.75 5.22
(0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
APA - VCM 1.88 -1.55 1.12 1.52 4.75
(0.03) (0.94) (0.13) (0.06) (0.00)
APA - LOT -4.09 1.52 -2.84 -4.39 -0.92
(1.00) (0.06) (1.00) (1.00) (0.82)
Note: the table reports Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (normalized z-statistics) for the hypoth-
esis that the median of the diﬀerence between individual relative provisions to the public
good in the given two treatments is zero. P-values (in brackets), based on the standard
normal distribution, refer to one-sided tests as predicted by the theory.
The test statistics are positive and highly signiﬁcant at all time horizons
(except for round 1) in the comparison between LOT and VCM. APA pro-
vision also signiﬁcantly outperforms VCM, although the signiﬁcance level is
quite variable across sub-samples, owing to the diﬀerent eﬀects of repetition
in the two treatments.
Result 1: Both the lottery and the all-pay auction are more
eﬀective than voluntary contribution in funding public goods.
The comparison between LOT and APA indicates that not only APA does
not perform better than LOT, but also public good provision is statistically
higher in LOT than in APA, contrary to the model’s predictions.
Result 2: The lottery is more eﬀective than the all-pay auc-
tion in funding public goods.
It is interesting to observe that incentive-based funding mechanisms are
generally eﬃcient in covering the cost of the prize. Averaging over all sessions
and rounds for each treatment, group contributions cover the cost of the prize
in 96.3 per cent of the cases in LOT and 88.3 per cent of the cases in APA.
Thus the lottery outperforms the all-pay auction also in terms of ﬁnancial
eﬃciency.
184.4 Comparison between Treatments by Income Level
So far we have considered contributions by taking averages over all subjects,
thus abstracting from diﬀerences across individuals characterized by diﬀerent
income levels. The theory, however, provides predictions for the contribu-
tions of each income type (see Table 1). In this section we focus explicitly on
income heterogeneity. We ﬁrst examine whether individuals with diﬀerent
incomes behave as predicted by the theory and how over-contribution is re-
lated to income levels. Next, we consider how diﬀerent funding mechanisms
compare at diﬀerent ends of the income distribution.
Table 6 and Figures 6 and 7 provide a description of the relationship be-
tween contributions and income levels. In all treatments absolute provisions
rise with income levels, so that relative provisions are generally relatively
similar across income types. Over-contributions in VCM are observed for
all income types, and rise slightly with income in absolute terms. In LOT
all income types over-contribute and, contrary to the theoretical predictions,
absolute contributions rise almost linearly with income. In APA, absolute
contributions rise with income, although not as steeply as predicted by the
theory. As a consequence, the three lowest-income types over-contribute,
while the contributions of subjects with the highest income (240) are very
close to the theoretical prediction.
Result 3: Absolute contributions are weakly related to income
in VCM, and steeply increasing in income in both LOT and APA.
Figures 8 and 9 provide a comparison of absolute and relative provision
in the three treatments by income levels.10 Interestingly, the lottery outper-
forms both other mechanisms for all income types. Public good provision in
APA is higher than in VCM for income types 160 and 240, but the opposite
holds for the lowest income type, indicating that prizes in contests provide
relatively less eﬀective incentives for poorer individuals.
Table 7 presents results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of the null hypoth-
esis that median public good provision is the same across treatments, when
considering separately each income type. The results indicate that LOT per-
forms signiﬁcantly better than VCM for all income types except the lowest.
LOT also performs signiﬁcantly better than APA for incomes 120 and 200.
APA does signiﬁc a n t l yb e t t e rt h a nV C Mo n l yf o ri n c o m et y p e1 6 0 .
Result 4: The lottery outperforms the other funding mechanisms
for all income types.
10Note that in order to ensure comparability we assumed that in VCM the 120 tokens
of public provision can be attributed to each income-type on the basis of equal income
shares (about 17%).
19Table 6: Average relative contributions: by endowment and rounds
Rounds
Endowment Predicted 1 - 20 1 1 - 10 11 - 20 20
VCM-120 0.0 28.4 37.8 36.5 20.2 9.2
VCM-160 0.0 15.3 31.5 16.3 14.4 8.6
VCM-200 0.0 23.8 35.8 27.2 20.3 10.8
VCM-240 0.0 19.0 35.1 24.6 13.4 4.1
LOT-120 37.5 47.1 36.6 52.0 42.3 40.3
LOT-160 28.1 48.2 46.4 49.8 46.6 45.6
LOT-200 22.5 48.5 46.3 49.8 47.1 43.1
LOT-240 18.7 44.1 47.7 46.0 42.2 32.3
APA-120 4.2 35.6 49.3 35.7 35.6 37.6
APA-160 17.5 40.7 35.7 42.3 39.1 41.5
APA-200 34.0 40.8 53.8 46.4 35.1 36.9
APA-240 42.5 41.1 53.1 48.5 33.7 33.2
Note: contributions are expressed as a percentage of the endowment.
4.5 Comparison between Treatments at Individual Level
We ﬁnally consider the relative performance of the three mechanisms at the
individual level. Figure 10 compares thec u m u l a t i v ed i s t r i bution functions
of relative contributions for the three treatments. The main diﬀerence be-
tween the two prize-based mechanism is that in APA subjects choose zero
contributions about three times as often as in LOT (20.8 and 5.83 per cent,
respectively). The cumulative distribution for APA lies above that for LOT
only up to a relative contribution of 50 per cent, while the two distributions
are virtually identical thereafter. Note also that, although average contribu-
tions in APA and VCM are relatively similar, the distributions of individual
contributions in the two treatments are similar only for low relative contri-
butions.
Result 5: At the individual level, APA is characterized by a
much higher fraction of zero contributions than LOT.
Figure 11 compares the cumulative distribution functions of relative con-
tributions for the three treatments, considering individual income types. It
is interesting to observe that the diﬀerence between APA and LOT in the
frequency of low contributions is very pronounced for low income types, but
it becomes less and less evident for higher income types. While in LOT sub-
jects contribute almost uniformly irrespective of their income type, in APA
20low-income individuals contribute zero much more often, as predicted by the
theory. Nevertheless, low relative contributions are much more frequent than
predicted by the theory for high-income individuals.
Table 7: Tests of equality between treatments by income level
Incomes
Treatments 120 160 200 240
LOT - VCM 1.05 2.62 2.09 3.14
(0.15) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
APA - VCM -1.05 2.62 0.00 1.32
(0.85) (0.00) (0.50) (0.09)
APA - LOT -3.14 -1.57 -2.09 -0.52
(0.00) (0.06) (0.98) (0.70)
Note: the table reports Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (normalized z-statistics) for the hypoth-
esis that the median of the diﬀerence between individual contributions in the given two
treatments is zero. P-values (in brackets), based on the standard normal distribution,
r e f e rt oo n e - s i d e dt e s t sa sp r e d i c t e db yt h et h e o r y .
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245C o n c l u s i o n s
A number of experimental papers have analysed public good provision when
incomes are heterogeneous. However, these studies have only explored volun-
tary contributions. The experimental literature on fund-raising mechanisms
based on prizes has focused on the case of income homogeneity. To our knowl-
edge, this paper is the ﬁrst experimental investigation of the performance of
incentive-based fund-raising mechanisms when subjects have heterogenous
endowments which are private information. We compared a lottery and an
all-pay auction, while also considering a voluntary contribution mechanism
as a benchmark.
The results indicate that the introduction of a prize has sizeable eﬀects
on individual contributions relative to the VMC. Both the lottery and the
all-pay auction outperform voluntary contributions after taking into account
the cost of the prize. The lottery, in particular, systematically and signiﬁ-
cantly outperforms VCM. Averaging over all rounds, public good provision
is 20 per cent higher in the lottery than in VCM. Provision in the all-pay
auction is also higher than in VCM, but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant in
the earlier rounds of the sessions. This is an important result. It indicates
that, in a setting where agents have heterogeneous incomes which are private
information, prize-based fund-raising mechanisms can be an eﬀective way of
overcoming free riding.
The comparison between the incentive-based mechanisms indicates that,
contrary to the theoretical predictions, contributions to the public good are
signiﬁcantly higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction. This result sug-
gests a number of possible interpretations. It could be argued that subjects
are more familiar with lotteries than with all-pay auctions. As a consequence,
they might tend to bid more conservatively in the latter. This intuition is
supported by the ﬁnding that, at the individual level, subjects choose zero
contributions in APA three times as often as in LOT. It could also be ar-
gued that subjects perceive the lottery as more fair than the all-pay auction.
However, such arguments would not help explain the diﬀerences between our
result and those in Orzen (2005) and in Schram and Onderstal (2006). The
ﬁrst study found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two mechanisms, fo-
cusing on homogeneous endowments and complete information. On the other
hand, Schram and Onderstal (2006) focused on the case of symmetric endow-
ments but heterogeneous preferences which are private information, ﬁnding
that the all-pay auction raises higher revenues, as predicted by the theory.
Focusing on income heterogeneity, over-contributions are observed for all
income types in VCM, and are slightly increasing with income in absolute
terms. In the all-pay auction, absolute contributions rise with income, even
though not as steeply as predicted by the theory. In the lottery, all income
25types over-contribute and, contrary to the theoretical predictions, absolute
contributions rise linearly with income. The comparison of contributions
across treatments indicates that the lottery outperforms both other mech-
anisms for all income types. This result indicates that, from a theoretical
perspective, the completely symmetric equilibrium of a lottery game does
not seem to properly describe the actual behaviour of subjects. Further, ex-
periments on lotteries focusing on homogeneous endowments may be missing
a crucial trait of the subject’s behaviour.
There are several extensions for future research. A crucial point would
be to investigate whether and how the speciﬁc features of the experimental
designs can explain the diﬀerences between our results and the ﬁndings of
other studies (see Orzen, 2005; Schram and Onderstal, 2006). Further, it
would be interesting to develop a model that predicts a positive correlation
between contributions and endowments in a lottery.
26Appendix A: Instructions
[ALL TREATMENTS]
Welcome. Thanks for participating in this experiment. If you follow the
instructions carefully and make good decisions you can earn an amount of
m o n e yt h a tw i l lb ep a i dt oy o ui nc a s ha tt h ee n do ft h ee x p e r i m e n t .D u r i n g
the experiment you are not allowed to talk or communicate in any way with
other participants. If you have any questions raise your hand and one of the
assistants will come to you to answer it. The rules that you are reading are
the same for all participants.
General rules
There are 16 people participating in this experiment. At the beginning of
the experiment each participant will be assigned randomly and anonymously
an endowment of either 120, 160, 200, or 240 tokens with equal probabilities.
The experiment will consist of 20 rounds. In each round you will have
the same endowment that has been assigned to you at the beginning of the
experiment. In each round you will be assigned randomly and anonymously
to a group of four people. Therefore, of the other three people in your group
you will not know the identity and the endowment, that could be 120, 160,
200, or 240 tokens with equal probabilities.
How your earnings are determined
In each round you have to decide how to allocate your endowment between
an INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT and a GROUP ACCOUNT, considering the
following information:
• for each token that you allocate to the INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT you
will receive 2 points.
• for each token allocated to the GROUP ACCOUNT (by you or by any
other of the members of your group), every group member will receive
1p o i n t .
[VCM]
In each round you will receive 120 bonus points.
At the end of each round the computer will display how many tokens you
have allocated to the two accounts and how many points you have obtained
from each of the two accounts and in total. At the end of the experiment the
total number of points you have obtained in the 20 rounds will be converted
in Euros at the rate 1000 points = 1 Euro. The resulting amount will be
paid to you in cash.
27[LOT]
I ne a c hr o u n dy o uc a nw i nap r i z eo f240 points on the basis of the
following rules. For each token allocated to the GROUP ACCOUNT you
will receive a lottery ticket. At the end of each round the computer selects
randomly the winning ticket among all the tickets purchased by the members
of your group. The owner of the winning ticket wins the prize of 240 points.
Thus, your probability of winning is given by the number of tokens you place
in the GROUP ACCOUNT divided by the total number of tokens placed
in the GROUP ACCOUNT by members of your group. In case no tokens
are placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT, the winner of the prize is selected
randomly among the four members of the group.
At the end of each round the computer will display how many tokens you
have allocated to the two accounts and how many points you have obtained
from each of the two accounts, from the prize, and in total. At the end of the
experiment the total number of points you have obtained in the 20 rounds
will be converted in Euros at the rate 1000 points = 1 Euro. The resulting
amount will be paid to you in cash.
[APA]
I ne a c hr o u n dy o uc a nw i nap r i z eo f240 points on the basis of the
following rules. The member of your group who allocates the highest amount
to the GROUP ACCOUNT is the winner of the prize. In case of ties among
o n eo rm o r eg r o u pm e m b e r s ,t h ew i n n e ri sd e t e r m i n e dr a n d o m l y .
At the end of each round the computer will display how many tokens you
have allocated to the two accounts and how many points you have obtained
from each of the two accounts, from the prize, and in total. At the end of the
experiment the total number of points you have obtained in the 20 rounds
will be converted in Euros at the rate 1000 points = 1 Euro. The resulting
amount will be paid to you in cash.
28Appendix B
In this appendix we study a linear public good game ﬁnanced through an
all-pay auction in which one prize is awarded, assuming that players have
homogeneous preferences but heterogeneous endowments and information is
complete. We solve the game for N players, who can have any possible
endowment, and for any positive level of prize.
Consider N players and the set of endowments Z =( z1,...,zS)s u c ht h a t
0 <z 1 <. ..<z S. Each player has an endowment which assumes a value




n[zi]=N. The players’ endowments and their number are common
knowledge. With no loss of generality, assume that n[zi] ≥ 0f o r1≤ i ≤ S−1
and n[zS] ≥ 1. Players play a public good game in which each individual
has to choose how much to contribute to the public good. At the same time
they take part in an all-pay auction in which a prize is awarded to the agent
who contributes the most. The bidders are risk-neutral and they all value
the prize at Π > 0.
The payoﬀ for a player with endowment zi who contributes gi is given by
β(zi − gi)+βE[Π,g i,g −i]+gi + G−i
where G−i represents the sum of all other players’ contributions and 1 <
β <N . Note that this expression is the same as the one used to deﬁne the
payoﬀ in Section 2, with β = n
α. Note also that, in the experimental design
presented in Section 3, n =4a n dα =2 ,s ot h a tβ =2 .
We divide our analysis in two parts: the case where n[zS] > 1a n dw h e r e
n[zS]=1 .
More than One Player with the Highest Endowment
We study ﬁrst the case in which n[zS] > 1. Let us deﬁne the following
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 Call type-symmetric equilibrium an equilibrium in which agents
with the same endowment play according to the same strategy.
There exist three possible scenarios: the prize level can be “high”, “medium”
or “low”. In the next two propositions, we show that if and only if the prize
level is “high” there exists a type-symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 1 When n[zS] > 1 and zS ≤
βΠ
n[zS](β−1), there exists a type-
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which players with endowment zS
contribute their full endowment, while if there are other agents with lower
endowments they all contribute 0.
29Proof. If all players with endowment zS contribute their full endowment




− (β − 1)zS + G−i
which is greater or equal than the payoﬀ he could get from any other choice
g ∈ [0,z S).11
If there are other players with lower endowments it is equally obvious
that contributing 0 is for them a dominant strategy.
Proposition 2 When n[zS] > 1 and
βΠ
n[zS](β−1) <z S, there exist no type-
symmetric pure strategy equilibria.
Proof. In order to prove this it is enough to show that there exist no
equilibria in which players with endowment zS play according to the same
pure strategy. The proof is in two parts.
i) Consider ﬁrst the case in which
βΠ
n[zS](β−1) <z S ≤
βΠ
β−1.S u p p o s e t h a t
players with endowment zS contribute g ∈ [0,z S), then player i has an in-
centive to raise his own bid by an amount ε and win the prize. Equally, if
all of them contribute zS,t h e np l a y e ri has an incentive to contribute 0.
i i )C o n s i d e rn o wt h ec a s ei nw h i c hzS >
βΠ
β−1.N o t i c eﬁrst that any contri-
bution g>
βΠ
β−1 is dominated by g = 0. Suppose that players with endowment
zS contribute g ∈ [0,
βΠ
β−1). Player i has an incentive to raise his own bid by
an amount ε and win the prize. On the other hand if all of them contribute
g =
βΠ
β−1,t h e np l a y e ri has an incentive to deviate and contribute nothing.
If the prize level is “medium” only the agents with the highest endowment
will submit non-zero bids.
Proposition 3 When
βΠ
n[zS](β−1) <z S <
βΠ
β−1 and n[zS] > 1 there exists a
mixed strategy equilibrium in which:
• players with endowment zS contribute their full endowment with prob-
ability p a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 − p they choose their contribution from




n[zS]−1 on the interval [0,a],






• players with endowments lower than zS contribute 0.
11In all the proofs G−i represents the sum of all other agents’ contributions.
30Proof. The proof is in ﬁve parts.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the players with endowment zS and show that, when
they are the only active bidders, the candidate equilibrium is indeed an
equilibrium.
i) Assume that all but one of the n[zS] players with endowment zS choose





interval [0,a], where 0 <a<z S. Then the expected payoﬀ of the remaining
player i from contributing g ∈ [0,a]i sg i v e nb y
βzS + βΠ(F(g))
n[zS]−1 − (β − 1)g + G−i
= βzS + G−i
which is independent of g.
Assume now that n[zS] − 1 players contribute their full endowment with


















pj(1−p)n[zS]−j−1 represents i’s probability of tying with j other
players, while
βΠ
j+1 is his expected prize when he ties with j others. Applying
binomial rules expression (3) can be rewritten as
βΠ
1 − (1 − p)n[zS]
n[zS]p
and therefore player i’s expected payoﬀ from playing zS is given by
βzS + βΠ
1 − (1 − p)n[zS]
n[zS]p
− (β − 1)zS + G−i
For this to be an equilibrium player i’s expected payoﬀ from contributing
zS must be equal to his expected payoﬀ from choosing any g ∈ [0,a], which
means that
βzS + βΠ
1 − (1 − p)n[zS]
n[zS]p
− (β − 1)zS + G−i
= βzS + G−i
Therefore p must satisfy the following






31ii) We are going to prove that there is a unique solution to equation (4).
This equation can be rewritten as





Notice that the left hand side is concave while the right hand side is linear.
Further, given the restrictions on zS,i ti st h ec a s et h a t1<
n[zS](β−1)zS
βΠ <
n[zS]. When p = 0 both sides of the equation are equal to zero. When p =1
t h el e f th a n ds i d ei se q u a lt o1w h i l et h el eft hand side is strictly greater than
1. Finally, notice that the slope of the left hand side when p =0i sn[zS],
which is steeper than the right hand side. Therefore there must be a unique
solution for p ∈ (0,1].
iii) We want to show that a, such that F(a)=1− p, is strictly less than
zS. We will prove it by contradiction. Assume the opposite, then it should be
t h ec a s et h a tF(zS) ≤ 1−p. Given equation (4), the latter can be rearranged
as
1 − (1 − p)
n[zS] ≤ n[zS]p(1 − p)
n[zS]−1 (5)
When p = 0 both sides are equal to 0. The ﬁrst derivative of the left hand side
is equal to n[zS](1− p)
n[zS]−1, while the ﬁrst derivative of the right hand side
is n[zS](1− p)
n[zS]−1−(n[zS]−1)n[zS]p(1−p)n[zS]−2.N o t i c et h a tt h ef o r m e r
is strictly greater than the latter for any p on the interval (0,1]. Therefore
the left hand side of inequality (5) is strictly greater than the right hand side
for any positive probability, which contradicts our assumption.
iv) What we have just shown means that the players will not choose any
contribution from the interval (a,zS). Let us check that this is the case.
Assume that all other players play according to the candidate equilibrium
while player i contributes g ∈ (a,zS). Then i wins the prize with probability
(1 − p)n[zS]−1 =
(β−1)a







n[zS]−1 − (β − 1)g + G−i
= βzS +( β − 1)a − (β − 1)g + G−i
which is strictly less than βzS + G−i. Therefore contributing 0 dominates
any choice g ∈ (a,zS).
v) Let us now show that, when players with endowment zS play according
to the equilibrium candidate, it is a dominant strategy for all the other
players to contribute nothing. Suppose that zS−1 >a .P o i n ti v )p r o v e st h a t
contributing 0 dominates any g ∈ (a,zS−1]. On the other hand, if a player i
















it must be the case that contributing 0 is a dominant strategy for all players
with endowment lower than zS.
T h es a m ei st r u ew h e nzS−1 ≤ a.
Finally, if the prize level is “low” only the players with endowments higher
than
βΠ
β−1 will contribute positive amounts.
Proposition 4 When zS ≥
βΠ
β−1 and n[zS] > 1, there exists a mixed strategy
equilibrium in which:
• players with endowment zi ≥
βΠ





m−1 on the interval [0,
βΠ
β−1],w h e r e
m is the number of players with endowment greater or equal than
βΠ
β−1;
• all other players contribute 0.
Proof. Suppose that zl−1 <
βΠ
β−1 while zl ≥
βΠ




n[zi] the number of players with endowment greater or equal than
βΠ
β−1.I fl = 1 then consider zl−1 to be zero. The proof is in four parts.
i) Notice ﬁrst that any strategy above
βΠ
β−1is dominated by contributing
0.
ii) Let us focus on the interval (zl−1,
βΠ
β−1]w h e r eo n l ym players are active.
Assume that all but one of the m players choose their contribution from the
distribution function F(g)o nt h ei n t e r v a l( zl−1,
βΠ
β−1]. In order for this to
be an equilibrium the remaining player i must be indiﬀerent to play any
g ∈ (zl−1,
βΠ
β−1]. Hence his expected payoﬀ from playing g must be
βzi + βΠ(F(g))
m−1 − (β − 1)g + G−i = βzi + G−i + c
where c ≥ 0.
This means that on the interval (zl−1,
βΠ
β−1] any player with endowment
greater than zl−1 randomises according to the following distribution function
F(g)=(







β−1) ≤ 1 implies that c must be equal to 0 and therefore we







33iii) Suppose that l = 1. When the other N − 1 players choose their
contribution from F(g)o nt h ei n t e r v a l[ 0 ,
βΠ
β−1], then player i’s expected payoﬀ
is equal to
βzi + G−i
independently of his contribution on the same interval.
iv) If l>1 then point v) of the proof of Proposition (3) shows that
contributing 0 is a dominant strategy for all players with endowment less
than
βΠ
β−1, while players with higher endowments will randomise according to
F(g) from the interval [0,
βΠ
β−1].
Only One Player with the Highest Endowment
We look now at the case where n[zS] = 1. First we will prove that only mixed
strategy equilibria exist.
Proposition 5 When n[zS]=1there exist no pure strategy equilibria.
Proof. The proof is in two parts.
i) Consider the case zS−1 <
βΠ
β−1. Suppose that there exists a pure strategy
equilibrium characterised by the strategy proﬁle [g1,...,g i,...,g N], where gi
is the contribution chosen by the generic player i.C a l lgh the highest con-
tribution. If gh >z S−1 then the player with endowment zS could marginally
lower his bid and increase his payoﬀ.I f gh <z S−1 then there is at least
one player who could deviate and contribute gh + ε, winning the prize and
making a positive proﬁt. If gh = zS−1 and a player with endowment zS−1 is
contributing gh, then the player with the highest endowment has an incen-
tive to deviate and contribute zS−1 + ε.I f gh = zS−1 and the players with
endowment zS−1 are contributing strictly less than gh, then the player with
endowment zS could lower his bid increasing his payoﬀ.
i i )C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ezS−1 ≥
βΠ
β−1. Notice that any strategy g>
βΠ
β−1 is
dominated by g =0 .A sw eh a v ed o n ea b o v e ,s u p p o s et h a tt h e r ee x i s t sap u r e
strategy equilibrium characterised by the strategy proﬁle [g1,...,g i,...,g N]
and call gh the highest contribution. If gh <
βΠ
β−1 then there is at least one
player who has an incentive to deviate and contribute gh+ε.I fgh =
βΠ
β−1and
only one player is contributing gh, then he could lower his bid. If gh =
βΠ
β−1
and two or more players are bidding gh, then each one of them would be
better oﬀ by contributing zero.
There exist two possible cases: when the prize level is “low” and when it
is “high”. Let us start focusing on the ﬁrst scenario.
Proposition 6 When zS−1 ≥
βΠ
β−1 and n[zS]=1 , there exists a mixed strat-
egy equilibrium in which:
34• players with endowment zi ≥
βΠ





m−1 on the interval [0,
βΠ
β−1],w h e r e
m is the number of players with endowment greater or equal than
βΠ
β−1;
• all other players contribute 0.
Proof. Proof as in Proposition (4).
When the prize level is “high”, speciﬁcally zS−1 <
βΠ
β−1, if the strategy
space is continuous, and ties are broken by randomly assigning the prize to
one player, then no equilibrium exists. In order to avoid this problem, given
that we are interested in the theoretical predictions of an experiment, where
the strategy space is discrete, we will assume that there exists a smallest
currency unit strictly above zS−1 (see Che and Gale, 1997).12
Proposition 7 When zS−1 <
βΠ
β−1 and n[zS]=1 , there exists a mixed strat-
egy equilibrium in which:









terval [0,z S−1] and puts a mass equal to
βΠ−(β−1)zS−1
βΠ on the smallest
currency unit strictly above zS−1;











n[zS−1] on the interval (0,z S−1];
• all other players contribute zero.
Proof. Assuming that the players with budgets zS−1 and zS are the only
ones who submit positive bids, we show that by playing according to the
equilibrium candidate they make each others indiﬀerent between any possible
c h o i c e .W et h e ng oo nt op r o v et h a ti ft h e yp l a yi ns u c haw a yi ti sad o m i n a n t
strategy for all other players to contribute zero. The proof is in three parts.
i) Let us start supposing that the players with endowments strictly lower
than zS−1 contribute zero. Note ﬁrst that the player of type zS can guarantee
himself a positive surplus by submitting a bid above zS−1.W ew a n tt os h o w
12The non-existence of the equilibrium is due to a discontinuity in the payoﬀs. Another
way to avoid this problem would be to always break ties in favour of the player with the
higher budget.
35that if players with endowment zS−1 choose their contribution from L(g),




n[zS−1], then the agent with the
highest endowment is indiﬀerent between any choice on the interval (0,z S−1].
His payoﬀ from playing g ∈ (0,z S−1] will be
βzS + βΠ(L(g))
n[zS−1] − (β − 1)g + G−i
= βzS + βΠ(
βΠ − (β − 1)(zS−1 − g)
βΠ
) − (β − 1)g + G−i
= βzS + βΠ − (β − 1)zS−1 + G−i
which indeed does not depend on g.
ii) Suppose now that the player with endowment zS randomises accord-
ing to H(g) on the interval [0,z S−1] and puts a mass equal to
βΠ−(β−1)zS−1
βΠ
on the smallest currency unit strictly above zS−1.13 If all other agents





n[zS−1], then the payoﬀ of a player with zS−1 from a choice
g ∈ [0,z S−1]i sg i v e nb y
βzS + βΠ(L(g))
n[zS−1]−1H(g) − (β − 1)g + G−i
= βzS + βΠ(








n[zS−1](βΠ − (β − 1)(zS−1 − g))
n[zS−1]−1
n[zS−1]
−(β − 1)g + G−i
= βzS + G−i
which again is independent of g. It should be clear now why it is necessary
to assume that there exists a smallest unit strictly above zS−1.I f t h i s w a s
not the case the player with the highest endowment would have a mass point
at zS−1. But then, if ties are broken by randomly assigning the prize to one
player, an agent of type zS−1 would have an incentive to deviate and bid all
his endowment.
iii) Finally, we want to show that if the agents of type zS−1 and zS play as
we described then it is a dominant strategy for all other players to contribute
zero. If a player i with endowment zi <z S−1 contributes g ∈ (0,z i]h i sp a y o ﬀ
is represented by
βzS + βΠ(L(g))
n[zS−1]H(g) − (β − 1)g + G−i (7)
13Note that, acording to H(g), player zS’s bid is strictly positive and therefore no ties
are possibile at zero.
36= βzS + βΠ(






n[zS−1](βΠ − (β − 1)(zS−1 − g))
n[zS−1]−1
n[zS−1]
− (β − 1)g + G−i
= βzS +(




n[zS−1](β − 1)g − (β − 1)g + G−i
= βzS +( β − 1)g((




n[zS−1] − 1) + G−i





n[zS−1] < 1 and we conclude that expression (7)
is strictly lower than βzS + G−i.
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